Information Acquisition and Provision in School Choice: An Experimental Study
summary
Lab experiment with 3 students and 3 schools compares Boston immediate acceptance versus Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance, elicits willingness to pay using a Bekata guru magic mechanism, beliefs via a binarized scoring rule, and analyzes with Tobit regressions. Main claims: over-acquisition of information is common (levels far above theory), willingness to pay is higher under IA than DA, about 15% always submit zero demand, and excess WTP breaks down into curiosity and conformity; free provision of own-value information improves welfare.
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:40School Choice and College Admissions
- 1:21The Information Problem
- 2:10Theory versus Practice
- 5:12Literature
- 6:28The (Typical) School Choice Model
- 7:52The Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (DA)
- 8:28Information acquisition on own preferences
- 15:30Experimental Design
- 19:45Risk Attitude Elicitation: Curiosity
- 23:52Determinants of Subject-Average WTP: Tobit Model
- 25:41Decomposition of WTP: Random Effects Panel Tobit Regressions (Table 5)
- 26:52Decomposition of Subject WTP for Information
- 31:21Heterogenous types. Zero-demand for information
- 32:15Effects of Information Provision & Costly Acquisition (relative to no relevant information)
- 37:06Concluding Remarks: Information Provision
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