Deep Dive: TUF / Notary
summary
TUF provides compromise resilience for software updates with self-revocation and key rotation so delegated keys can revoke or replace themselves without every delegator changing metadata; it uses roles (root, timestamp, snapshot, targets) and threshold multisig keys kept offline, and plans a 1.0 spec with semantic versioning and pluggable wire formats. Notary is the widely used Go server/client implementation running in production alongside registries. in-toto records in-toto layouts and signed link metadata from automated functionaries (Jenkins, admission controllers) to attest full supply-chain provenance.
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chapters (27)
- 0:00Start
- 0:21There exists an attack vector
- 2:00Doesn't crypto just work?
- 2:15Attack: Compromise
- 5:27TUF Goal: Compromise-Resilient E3
- 5:58Explicit & Implicit Revocation
- 6:51Responsibility Separation
- 7:54Minimize Risk
- 9:55Multi-signature Trust
- 11:25Standardization process (TAPS).
- 11:43TAP 8: Key Rotation
- 13:06TAP: Managing TUF Versions
- 14:03TAP: POUF
- 15:51TAP: Handling Partially Signed Metadata
- 17:39The Software Supply Chain
- 18:41The Attack Surface
- 19:12Imagine In The Real World...
- 20:06Many Good Point Solutions
- 22:07Gaps Between Steps? Compliance?
- 23:00Layout -- Steps
- 23:26Layout -- Functionaries
- 23:41Layout -- Artifacts
- 23:59Layout -- Rules
- 24:15Layout -- Root Of Trust
- 24:35Links -- Signed Step Evidence
- 25:08Verification/Admission
- 25:44Tooling & Integrations
related talks
36mTUF / Notary Project Intro
34mWhen the Going Gets Tough, Get TUF Going! [I]
42mTUF / Notary Deep Dive
41mWhen The Going Gets Tough, Get TUF Going!
18mBeyond signatures: Using TUF and Notary to Secure Software Distribution
26mTUF-En Up Your Signatures
29mTUF-en up Your Software Supply Chain
37mUsing TUF and in-toto to Tighten the Release Process.
