Beyond signatures: Using TUF and Notary to Secure Software Distribution
summary
Adapts The Update Framework into a registry-focused implementation and a Notary v2 adaptation that aims to survive server and some key compromises; implements threshold signatures, timestamp and snapshot metadata, and encourages offline root keys for high-security roles. Adds client pinning of targets keys so clients can lock which public keys sign specific images, plus compact “binning” delegations to scale to millions of images. Provides a prototype reference implementation and ongoing design work on CNCF channels.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:12Why do we care
- 1:15What are we doing
- 2:35Threat model
- 4:07Cryptographic signatures
- 5:19The downside of cryptographic signatures
- 6:36Summary of attacks
- 8:28TUF attacks
- 9:55TUF principles
- 11:48Explicit and implicit relocation
- 12:31Offline keys
- 13:18Securing the system
- 14:40New features
- 17:00Learn more
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