The "Last Mile" of Security: Roman Korkikikan on Hacking TPMs with Budget Hardware
summary
Demonstrates a successful attack on a TPM of an edge server using power analysis and voltage injection, built with a custom sensing board plus used oscilloscopes bought on eBay, totaling less than $2,000. Shows side‑channel and fault techniques extract secrets from a real device, firmware patches mitigate the specific implementation but full fixes require hardware replacement or slow certification, and confirms that low‑cost lab gear can perform practical TPM compromises.
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