Breaking The Root Of Trust Practical Side Channel Key Extraction From A TPM
summary
Edge TPMs on shipped servers leak secrets: $2,000 power side‑channel setup plus a decades‑old oscilloscope and Raspberry Pi records power and SPI traces, letting attackers read PCRs and SPI bus sniffing recovers vault key in cleartext. Timing leaks reveal leading‑zero bits of ECDSA keys; a crafted special‑point multiplication‑by‑zero attack extracts the remaining ECDH private key bit‑by‑bit. The exploit requires no device modification, leaves no tamper traces, and succeeds against a certified commercial TPM.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Introduction to TPM attacks
- 3:05Understanding edge servers
- 6:18Trusted Platform Module basics
- 9:06TPM market and vulnerabilities
- 13:25Targeting TPM cryptographic keys
- 14:50Side channel attack setup
- 19:29Extracting ECDSA private keys
- 21:37Montgomery ladder analysis
- 24:05Zero multiplication attack
- 26:11Attack disclosure and fixes
- 27:14Lessons learned from research
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