EUCLEAK
summary
New side‑channel recovers ECDSA nonces from Infineon SLE78 by analyzing the EA modular‑inverse loop with an EM probe and a Ledger smartcard bench, then brute‑forcing a 32‑bit multiplicative mask to get private keys. A training JavaCard and a UbiKey 5Ci are used, 200 EM traces are recorded, six good traces picked and the attack succeeds on five, allowing full key recovery and cloning. Infineon issues a patch extending the mask to curve size and many CC‑certified Infineon crypto libs are affected.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (6)
- 0:00Introduction and motivation
- 6:57What is a secure element
- 16:35Targeting FIDO tokens
- 23:04Side channel setup and leakage
- 31:09Attack requirements and impact
- 37:43Q&A session
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