MIFARE Classic: Exposing The Static Encrypted Nonce Variant
summary
A family of MIFARE Classic S‑variant cards uses a static encrypted nonce that is predictable by sector and key and a hidden backdoor read key in multiple vendors including Fudan and legacy Philips/Infineon parts. Using Proxmark/Flipper Zero scripts to collect encrypted nonces and decrypt them, an emulation demo fools readers and a full clone workflow recovers keystream bits then brute forces keys in about two hours, optimized to ~25 minutes dump and near‑instant with a supply‑chain default‑nonce file.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:23Protocol and history
- 10:50Static nonce variant
- 23:08Identifying the backdoor
- 23:45First demo
- 23:55Analyzing backdoor capability
- 25:17Data-first attack
- 27:47Second demo
- 29:27Full key recovery
- 34:22Optimizing attacks
- 38:22Supply chain demo
- 39:57Final findings and resources
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