Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults...
summary
The paper analyzes Intel SGX-style enclaves and shows that a malicious OS can infer enclave memory accesses without causing page faults. It presents two new page-table-based attacks that exploit page table attributes and the caching behavior of page table memory to trace accesses, and demonstrates key recovery (EdDSA session keys) from Libgcrypt using these techniques.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Secret leakage without page faults
- 1:56SGX limitations and security
- 3:02Page fault side channels
- 5:56Execution flow side channels
- 7:23Demo: page fault attacks
- 10:14Measuring cache reload times
- 12:18Patch cable monitoring limits
- 14:06Detection resolution challenges
- 16:16Flash technique for side channels
- 18:05Secure memory access controls
- 19:50Tracking page access
- 21:19Patch cable behavior monitoring
- 22:45Measurement scripts
- 23:49New architectures needed
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