Characterizing the Nature and Dynamics of Tor Exit Blocking
summary
An empirical study uses an interactive Selenium crawler, k‑means plus regex classification, analysis of ~400 commercial blacklists and three million abuse emails to quantify Tor exit blocking: 20% of Alexa 500 sites block Tor on the front page, an extra 7.5% block on login, and ~4% on search; ten deployed exit relays show no correlation between exit policy and complaints; 38% of non‑DMCA complaints point to onion/compromised‑host high‑volume attacks and 7% of blacklists proactively add exits.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction to Tor blocking
- 2:24Scenario and methodology
- 5:10Measuring server-side blocking
- 7:30Analyzing exit relay behavior
- 9:41Abuse complaint analysis
- 11:52Threat intelligence evaluation
- 15:42Key research takeaways
- 16:57Q&A session
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