Keynote Presentation: What Vehicle Security Can Learn from Medical Device Security
summary
Medical device security history gives concrete precedents for vehicles: 2006 pacemaker RF replay attack allows disabling therapies and inducing fatal rhythms within meters; 2011 insulin pumps permit remote dump insulin commands; ransomware knocks hospitals offline (hundreds of sites, including a reported plan to target 400 hospitals), causing weeks-long radiation therapy outages and billion‑dollar losses; US law now mandates cybersecurity engineering and software bill of materials reporting tying components to NVD entries, a regulatory model that worked unevenly but reduced repeat mistakes.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Vehicle and medical security intro
- 1:58Medical device flaws in 2006
- 8:00Ransomware on infusion pumps
- 12:16Hard-coded password flaws
- 18:41FDA’s cybersecurity role
- 25:23Section 524B cybersecurity law
- 33:18Skepticism in medical security
- 38:53Similarities in vehicle and medical security
- 47:37Resources and future directions
- 54:57Q&A
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