Talk by Katrina Ligett (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
summary
Presents two concrete TCS approaches: a principal–agent model where an agent holds a cost-correlated signal X that the principal neither models nor knows, proves agents prefer revealing features that separate high-cost cases and prefer concealing low-cost cases, and shows simple garbling gives Pareto improvement (agents sometimes share noisy signals, benefiting both sides). The second gives a full characterization of one-run auditing for differential privacy, proves it fails on name-and-shame / all-or-nothing / XOR style algorithms, and shows adaptive guessing strengthens the audit bounds.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (16)
- 0:00Avrim Blum's impact and career
- 1:51Black boxes in ML and TCS reliability
- 3:18Delegation as principal-agent problem
- 6:27Regulator's unknown unknowns challenge
- 8:34Courier payment and agent incentives
- 10:39Formalizing unknown unknowns
- 13:52Agent metrics: reveal or conceal
- 16:41Garbling signals for mutual benefit
- 19:58Auditing black boxes in sensitive systems
- 22:13Differential privacy and loss
- 24:40Privacy auditing: purpose and methods
- 26:30One-run auditing for efficiency
- 28:16Limitations of one-run auditing
- 31:08Strengthening auditing with adaptive guessing
- 32:32TCS for trustworthy ML systems
- 33:58Q&A on delegation and incentives
related talks
38mBest of Both World Algorithms from I.I.D. to Adversarial Data
27mThe ethical algorithm
26mAaron Roth, Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania, NYC 2017
01h 16mLaw and CS
45mAGT and Machine Learning
01h 12mPedagogical Talk: Frameworks for Information-Computation Tradeoffs
01h 17mTutorial: Privacy, Part I
01h 14mTutorial: Privacy, Part III
