Post-Quantum Cryptography Conference Amsterdam 2023
2023-11-07..2023-11-08
-- online --
as the organisers put it
At this two day conference we will have speakers from U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), the Quantum Safe Cryptography working group of the Dutch Government, IBM, NXP, Cloudflare, and many more
| title | author | length |
|---|---|---|
| Status update from | Bill Newhouse, Dustin Moody | 35m |
NIST reports concrete progress: 82 submissions, 69 valid, 26 in round two, seven finalists, and in 2022 it selects Crystals Kyber (KEM) plus signatures… | ||
| Preparing the United States for Post Quantum Cryptography | Bill Newhouse | 26m |
U.S. policy now ties HR 7535 and White House memos to concrete timelines: a 90-day inventory requirement for agencies, an NIST NCCoE migration project launched… | ||
| A quantum cybersecurity agenda for Europe | Andrea Garcia Rodriguez | 22m |
European Policy Centre paper argues that quantum computing already shifts the cyber risk landscape and recommends an EU coordinated action plan plus a… | ||
| Post Quantum Policy and Roadmap of the BSI | Stephan Ehlen | 22m |
German federal policy treats PQC migration as urgent with a 2026 migration strategy milestone and a working hypothesis of usable quantum computers in the early… | ||
| ANSSI plan for post quantum transition | Jérôme Plût | 25m |
ANSSI lays out a three-phase roadmap that starts with an immediate hybridization mandate for high-impact products and long‑lived data, keeps hybrid combos… | ||
| Unlocking the Quantum Resilient Cryptography Strategy for the Dutch central government | Anita Wehmann, Germain van der Velden | 36m |
In this presentation, we will delve into the Dutch central governments’ approach to mitigate the risks of quantum technology. Quantum resilient Cryptography… | ||
| Ask the Experts: Global Perspectives on Post Quantum Cryptography Governance | Bill Newhouse, Andrea Garcia Rodriguez, Stephan Ehlen, Jérôme Plût, Anita Wehmann, Ronald Cramer | 23m |
Panelists say the first concrete task is an inventory of cryptographic assets so organisations know what to migrate, with national competence centres (NCCoE… | ||
| What is it going to take to break cryptography with a quantum computer | Itan Barmes | 33m |
Model lays out four concrete layers: algorithm, logical, physical qubits and architecture, and ties progress to measurable milestones rather than hype… | ||
| Crunching the Numbers Post Quantum Algorithm Performance | Tomas Gustavsson | 29m |
Benchmarks compare classic vs post‑quantum signatures using Bouncy Castle in software and five HSMs, with three HSMs interoperating on NIST Round‑3 Dilithium… | ||
| Comparing Strategies for Quantum-Safe Cryptography Adoption in Organizations | Jaime Gómez García | 33m |
Santander describes a concrete five-phase program (awareness, program definition, discovery, planning, execution) grounded on NIST, ETSI, BSI, CFDI and WEF… | ||
| Birth of the Post-Quantum Internet | Bas Westerbaan | 28m |
Cloudflare reports serving ~20% of domains and handling ~46M HTTP requests/sec, and shows post‑quantum key agreement (hybrid Kyber + classical) already on… | ||
| Post-Quantum Crypto Integration for Enterprise Applications | Anselme Tueno | 30m |
Project Trade-EVs II (BMWK FKZ: 01MV20006A) integrates post‑quantum primitives into real systems and reports practical frictions: PostgreSQL TLS with Kyber and… | ||
| Lattice based cryptography | Léo Ducas | 41m |
Lattice cryptography explains encryption as encoding a message as a lattice point then adding noise so decryption is matrix–vector multiplications with a short… | ||
| Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes | Volker Krummel | 41m |
Stateful hash-based signatures trade tiny public keys for a limited, trackable pool of one-time keys and require authenticated state transfers; the talk shows… | ||
| Code-based Cryptography | Simona Samardjiska | 43m |
Code-based cryptography remains a decades-old candidate for post-quantum standards but trades huge keys for well-studied hardness: classic McEliece parameters… | ||
| LMS: Lighter, faster key generation | Francisco José Vial-Prado | 22m |
Describes an implementation that combines SIMD SHA‑256 hashing and multithreading with an adapted RFC8554 low‑memory iterative algorithm to cut LMS… | ||
| Machine-checking post-quantum cryptography | Andreas Hülsing | 31m |
Post-quantum proofs are machine-checked using a toolchain that extracts a formal model from implementation code and proves security in EasyCrypt while… | ||
| Leading the Quantum-safe Transition: A Growth Stages Approach | Ini Kong | 20m |
Research from the HAPO project maps quantum-safe transition into five stages (initiate through continuous improvement), derives action sequences from… | ||
| Update from the GSMA Post Quantum Telco Network Task Force | Lory Thorpe | 29m |
A GSMA task force of more than 50 companies including 22+ major operators publishes a Post Quantum Telco Network impact whitepaper and is now building Quantum… | ||
| Building Your PQC Lab: Trust But Verify Your PQC Ecosystem | Blair Canavan | 30m |
Concrete steps for a PQC test environment: run crypto discovery across code, SharePoint and device fleets to inventory PKI, TLS, code‑signing and IoT keys… | ||
| Closing remarks for day 1 | Paul van Brouwershaven, Albert de Ruiter | 13m |
Conference wraps with concrete logistics and next steps: about 200 onsite, 1,500 registered remote attendees; remote audio issues are fixed; submit unanswered… | ||
| Post-Quantum Crypto: Challenges for Embedded Applications | Joppe Bos | 31m |
Post-quantum standards (Kyber, Dilithium) force real engineering tradeoffs: typical low-power devices have 4–16 KB SRAM and 16–32 KB flash, so memory usage is… | ||
| Challenges for the Post-Quantum Transition of Mobile Ecosystems | Gustavo Banegas | 30m |
Mobile implementations test SPHINCS on a common Snapdragon running Android 11 (Cortex A77/A55) and achieve a 3× speedup by parallelizing Merkle-tree work… | ||
| Hardware Cryptographic Modules | Blair Canavan, Giuseppe Damiano, Volker Krummel, Marc Stevens | 40m |
Hardware vendors report concrete steps toward post‑quantum HSMs: embedding an functionality module with Open Quantum Safe for in‑field testing, offering… | ||
| How to Sell Post-Quantum Readiness by Combining it with a Zero Trust Journey | Robert Hann | 35m |
Argues that bundling post‑quantum readiness into an existing zero trust program wins board funding by tying PQC tasks to funded deliverables. Recommends… | ||
| Quantum-safe PKI for the German administration | Kaveh Bashiri | 28m |
BSI runs the German administration PKI (VPKI) currently using RSA‑4096 and plans a parallel migration starting ~2025 with optimistic completion ~2035… | ||
| PKI PKI and PQC Strategy for Payment Card Industry | Jeremy King | 33m |
Overview of PCI's PQC strategy: PCI Security Standards Council maps a pragmatic migration, citing a 2035 road map and a near-term window around 2026+, while… | ||
| Post-Quantum Cryptography & Trust Services | Lizzy Polman | 32m |
Dutch supervisory authority for trust services maps concrete actions: nine qualified providers on the EU trust list, sharing ETSI and NIST guidance, using… | ||
| standardization of additional signature schemes | Dustin Moody | 29m |
NIST opens an on‑ramp for additional signature standards and receives 50 submissions, of which 40 are accepted into the first round across multivariate (many… | ||
| Moving toward a Quantum Security Maturity Index | Tom Patterson | 28m |
A proposed Quantum Security Maturity Index defines discrete levels from risk strategy and discovery to architecture, testing, trials, rollouts and steady‑state… | ||
| PKI deployments are as unique as any snowflake; how to build equally flexible PQ migration strategie | Greg Wetmore | 38m |
Classifies PKI deployments by concrete migration risks — discoverability gaps (use CBOM), hardware lock‑in, reachability and refresh cycles — and ties each to… | ||
| A testbed for evaluating post-quantum algorithms for the DNS | Elmer Lastdrager | 27m |
SIDN Labs builds a PQC-testbed for DNS that deploys DNSSEC with candidate post‑quantum algorithms, aims to be public next year, and measures real impacts… | ||
| Coping with post-quantum signatures in the WebPKI | Bas Westerbaan | 30m |
WebPKI requires six separate signatures during a TLS visit and most post‑quantum signature candidates are far from drop‑in: Falcon suffers floating‑point… | ||
| [DISCUSSION] Your cryptography will be broken, prepare yourself now! | Anita Wehmann, Germain van der Velden | 29m |
Session claims the Dutch central government is an urgent adopter because it holds state secrets, long‑confidential personal data and long‑lifespan critical… | ||
| A Sign of the Times: The Transition to Quantum Secure Authentication | Sandra Guasch Castello | 26m |
Examines FIDO2 (WebAuthn) migration to post‑quantum primitives with concrete benchmarks: an open‑source end‑to‑end FIDO2 implementation runs PQC on Solo/Nitro… | ||
| Quantum Resistance through Symmetric Key Cryptography | Pasqualle Verwoerdt | 29m |
Claims that AES‑class symmetric ciphers are already post‑quantum secure with sufficient key length and that governments explicitly advise to supplement… | ||
| Symmetric Key Exchange: Lightweight Alternatives for a Post-Quantum IoT | Bor de Kock | 32m |
Proposes five symmetric authenticated key-exchange protocols that run with one, two or three messages, claim full forward secrecy for pre-shared keys by… | ||
| Vulnerabilities of Blockchain Security in the World of Quantum Computing | Andrew Cheung | 28m |
Argues that quantum computers (roadmap: 1100 qubits this year, 4,000 qubits within ~2 years) break current RSA/ECC signatures and thus blockchain authenticity… | ||
| Investigating Post-Quantum Cryptography: building a PQC decision tree for developers | Jelle Don, Alessandro Amadori | 30m |
A decision-support tool presents a fine-grained characteristic matrix comparing seven PQC candidates (Kyber, FrodoKEM, Classic McEliece, Dilithium, Falcon… | ||
| Using quantum-safe hybrid certificates for signing documents | Stefan van den Berg | 34m |
HAPKIDO work produces a Java proof of concept that extends the open-source DSS extension to create Catalyst hybrid PAdES signatures: a classical signature is… | ||
| and Signatures – no Problem? | Jan Klaußner | 32m |
Argues that qualified digital signatures require immediate action because legal signatures often must remain valid for 30 years while algorithmic certainty is… | ||
| Final Q&A | Paul van Brouwershaven, Albert de Ruiter | 28m |
Panel answers where practice meets policy: vendors demonstrate early tooling like SandboxAQ and recommend using existing enterprise vulnerability scanners for… | ||
| Recap: Unveiling Insights - A Two Day Conference Retrospective | Chris Hickman, Greg Wetmore, Jelle Don, Marc Stevens, Ronald Cramer, Thomas Attema, Tomas Gustavsson, Paul van Brouwershaven, Albert de Ruiter | 29m |
Conference recap reports concrete artifacts and limits: a PQC IP core runs on average FPGAs in 300–600 µs at security level 5 and promises ~10× speedup in… | ||
| Closing remarks | Paul van Brouwershaven, Albert de Ruiter | 03m |
Conference closes with thanks to sponsors and organizers and a note that the event runs as a nonprofit free stream to maximize access. Sponsors named are… | ||
| Opening | Paul van Brouwershaven, Albert de Ruiter | 21m |
Conference opening summarizes the PKI Consortium structure (about 110 members) and actionable projects: remote key attestation for proving keys were… | ||
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