Decommissioning the Kill Switch: Securing the Energy Grid’s...
summary
Modernize energy-grid software supply chains by enforcing cryptographically signed SBOMs from source to edge, building reproducible builds so binaries are deterministically verifiable, and running air-gapped, immutable edge OS and container images that can be audited and rebuilt from source. Cites concrete risks (80% of harbor cranes from one vendor, DJI vacuum data exfiltration, remotely locked tractors/buses) and concrete practices: fork GitHub to on‑prem GitLab, scan container repos (Docker Hub/artifactory) for provenance, separate delivery control planes from runtime. Proofs of concept and operational patterns are shown; full hardware sovereignty (open silicon) remains multi‑year work.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction and setup
- 1:04What are kill switches?
- 6:01Three pillars of sovereignty
- 9:14Secure software supply chain
- 17:25Sovereign workloads explained
- 20:58Sovereign operations focus
- 27:24Open source hardware debate
- 31:21Risk-based approach summary
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