Markets and Incentives for Transacting on (Personal) Information, Part II

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Walks through concrete economic models applied to personal data: search-cost models show centralization reduces transaction costs; Akerlof’s market for lemons formalizes how information asymmetry drives out high-quality data and predicts adverse selection under opt-in privacy; Posner’s empirical-style claim links privacy laws to higher interest rates and lower market efficiency; Varian flags secondary uses and resale; models of data intermediaries quantify how many customers and what noise make selling data viable; tools are formal game-theoretic models, some natural experiments, and connections to differential privacy.

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1. 0:00Intro
2. 0:57Why study privacy?
3. 2:17Economics: tools for study of welfare For privacy intervention to maximize weare, need to understand
4. 6:01Caveats
5. 8:09Talk Outline
6. 10:59"The Economics of Information" Stigler (1961)
7. 13:07"The market for lemons" Akerlof (1970)
8. 17:22"Job market signaling" Spence (1973)
9. 24:29"The economics of privacy" Posner (1981)
10. 35:32"Economic aspects of personal privacy" Varian (1997)
11. 38:05Property rights for information
12. 40:39Price discrimination
13. 47:09Information-sharing between competing firms
14. 48:02Who benefits from information?
15. 49:12"Markets for Information" Bergemann and Bonatti, Annual Review of
16. 54:11Additional issues