Non-Revelation Mechanism Design: Inference, Optimization, and Approximation

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Shows that the first-price position auction has a unique symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium that is efficient, and uses the revenue equivalence/payment-identity to prove no asymmetric equilibria. Builds a ranking order-statistic mechanism that computes each bidder’s rank against t−1 past samples, allocates by expected order statistics and charges first-price; this yields a (1−ε)-approximation to optimal welfare as t grows. Gives a simple weighted order statistic estimator for counterfactual revenues with O(1/√N) error and only logarithmic dependence on traffic split ε.

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" chapters (15)

1. 0:00Intro
2. 0:53The protagonist...
3. 4:17The Revelation Principle.
4. 5:59Example: Bayes-Nash Combinatorial Auctions
5. 7:53An Approach: Unrevelation Mechanisms
6. 10:44An Approach: Price of Anarchy.
7. 14:24Reduction
8. 22:57Iterative Population Model
9. 31:30Uniqueness
10. 32:06Revenue Equivalence
11. 33:07Non-existence of Asymmetric BNE
12. 34:18Proof of Theorem
13. 40:22Example: A/B testing
14. 40:55Results Overview
15. 43:17Classical Revenue Inference, Revisited