Timing “Versus” Matching: Thickness and Information in Dynamic Markets
summary
Model uses Poisson arrivals (rate m), independent edges with probability p and D = m·p as the expected degree, and agents hit an exponential “critical” clock (rate 1) that forces departure. Main quantitative claim: a patient rule that waits until someone is critical cuts losses exponentially, giving patient loss ≤ e^{-D/2}/2 versus a greedy bound ≥ 1/(2D+1); with D≈8 greedy loses ~8.5% while patient loses ~0.9%. If criticality is unobserved, waiting gives no benefit, so information about urgency is essential.
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chapters (22)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:31"Matching" Markets
- 1:18The Static Question
- 1:44Dynamic Matching Markets
- 2:33A New Question
- 2:58Motivating Example: Kidney Exchange
- 4:05Value of Waiting: More Information
- 5:38Questions about Timing
- 6:14Timing in Kidney Exchange
- 7:12This Paper: Main Findings
- 8:51Related Literature (Static) Theory
- 9:12Outline
- 14:01Model: Illustration
- 14:14Model: Two Key Parameters
- 18:20Goal
- 20:04Simple Local Matching Algorithms
- 21:08Comparing Algorithms
- 23:16Timing vs. Optimization
- 24:34Greedy vs. Patient vs. OPT
- 25:41Value of Information
- 27:08OPT Performance
- 31:19Last Policy Implication
