Privacy, Substitutes, and Optimization in Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions

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Deferred-acceptance clock auctions are presented as a practical design: implemented for the FCC’s reverse incentive auction with ~2,500 stations and about 600,000 constraints checked by a feasibility solver that runs in seconds, they guarantee group-strategy-proof outcomes, preserve unconditional winner privacy, and allow budget-balance and cost-minimization tweaks without full value disclosure. The method avoids global optimization (uses greedy/deferred-acceptance scoring rules), so it cannot implement welfare-optimal allocations when bidders exhibit complementarities — exact optimality requires substitutes — but it works fast and credibly for the FCC setting.

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1. 0:00Start
2. 0:40Interference Constraints (same- and adjacent channel)
3. 3:01Approximate Vickrey Auction?
4. 4:30FCC's Solution: Clock Auction
5. 5:44A Simple Example
6. 8:30Nice Features of Clock Auctions
7. 11:18Compare to Vickrey Auction
8. 13:41Descending Clock Auctions
9. 15:51Obvious Strategy-Proofness
10. 18:00Winners' Privacy
11. 20:51Proof Idea for (ii)
12. 22:21Suppose bidder i moves
13. 24:26Strategy-Proof Direct Auctions
14. 25:17Direct Deferred-Acceptance Auction
15. 27:40Examples of DA Auctions Cont'd
16. 28:29Optimizing Clock Auctions
17. 30:29Conclusion