Jason Hartline
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on a stage with
- Brendan Lucieronce
- Moshe Babaioffonce
- Nicole Immorlicaonce
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| title | conference | date |
|---|---|---|
| Proper Scoring Rules for Text and Super-alignment | Agency in Collaborative Learning 2026 | 2026-04-13 |
Proposes an algorithm that converts instructor reviews into a numeric rubric by calling summarization and question-answering oracles (domain-knowledge-free… | ||
| Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms | ITCS 2021 | 2021-01-06 |
Mechanisms that are truthful for quasi-linear agents remain structured when agents have convex payment disutility: each best response is a uniform scaling best… | ||
| Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces | Information Design and Data Science 2019 | 2019-10-01 |
Proposes publishing per-agent bidding dashboards that estimate win probability for every bid and then inverting observed bids to recover values, allowing a… | ||
| Non-Revelation Mechanism Design: Inference, Optimization, and Approximation | Complexity and Simplicity in Economics (Simons Institute workshop, 2015) | 2015-10-12 |
Shows that the first-price position auction has a unique symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium that is efficient, and uses the revenue equivalence/payment-identity… | ||
| Multi-Dimensional and Non-Linear Mechanism Design and Approximation I | Economics and Computation Boot Camp 2015 | 2015-08-24 |
Claims a modular route from single-agent solutions to multi-agent auctions using a ex-ante reduction (solve best single-player mechanism for each… | ||
| Multi-Dimensional and Non-Linear Mechanism Design and Approximation II | Economics and Computation Boot Camp 2015 | 2015-08-24 |
A reduction maximizes the sum of single-agent revenues subject to interim feasibility constraints (Border-style inequalities) and shows an ex ante relaxation… | ||
| nothing matches | ||