Thermanator and the Thermal Residue Attack
summary
Thermanator demonstrates that thermal residue on plastic external keyboards lets an attacker with a midrange thermal camera recover entire passwords up to about 30 seconds after entry and partial key sets as late as 60 seconds. Experiments use a FLIR SC620 ($1,500), 31 subjects typing 10 passwords on four popular keyboards (Dell, HP, Logitech, Azio), and eight evaluators who inspected 150 thermal recordings; hunt‑and‑peck typists leak more; long acrylic nails block the signal. Mitigations: chaff typing, hand swipes, randomized on‑screen entry.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (6)
- 0:00Introduction to attack
- 4:53Research questions
- 6:21Experimental setup
- 8:35Results and analysis
- 14:27Mitigation strategies
- 17:01Conclusion and Q&A
related talks
19mStay Cool! Understanding Thermal Attacks on Mobile-based User Authentication
30mCommSec D1 - Keynterceptor: Press Any Key to Continue
52m"New Tales of Wireless Input Devices - Matthias Deeg, Gerhard Klostermeier
27mProtecting Data In-Use from Firmware and Physical Attacks
01h 06mBackdoors in Back Doors
23mExploring Intentional Behaviour Modifications for Password Typing on Mobile Touchscreen
24mMy Google Glass Sees Your Passwords!
24mSecurity at your fingertips: Theory → Practice!