In Search of CurveSwap: Measuring Elliptic Curve Implementations in the Wild
summary
Internet-wide ZMap scans contact 41 million IPv4 hosts and find 28.8 million supporting ECDH, with 22% of TLS servers reusing ephemeral keys and 8,000+ servers advertising the weak secp160r1 (16% of sampled client hellos offer it), enabling theoretical discrete‑log downgrades; researchers send invalid points and observe 200,000 HTTPS hosts accept invalid points, but they do not find any hosts that both accept invalid points and reuse keys so no full CurveSwap found
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Start
- 6:06Tls
- 11:34Measure the Support for Individual Curves
- 15:18Solving the Discrete Logarithm Directly on some Weak Curves
- 17:33Invalid Point Attacks
- 23:41Takeaways
- 24:45Software Developers Should Add Cryptographic Validation to Your Test Suite
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