Bitcoin's Incentive Structure
summary
Explains why Bitcoin’s security depends on concrete assumptions and shows precise attacks and fixes: miners centralize into warehouses, block rate is deliberately ~one per 10 minutes, network handles about 150,000 transactions per day (~3.3 tx/s), and attackers under the supposed <50% bound can still profit. Presents an exact MDP-derived optimal selfish-mining policy, proves network delays make selfish mining profitable under network delays for much smaller miners, and outlines a DAG “chainless” protocol using ranked-pair voting to avoid those failures.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Intro
- 3:29The Blockchain
- 8:48Double Standard Tag
- 10:21Basic Theorem
- 13:52Incentives
- 21:22Incentives in Bitcoin
- 22:44Not Incentive Compatible
- 29:47Incentive Compatible
- 33:09Results
- 35:34Incentive Issues
- 44:39Conclusion
