When Oblivious is Not: Attacks against OPAM
summary
Shows a practical break of InvisiPage/OPAM: shuffling and single-page transfers occur outside the enclave without re‑encryption, so the OS observes which page is swapped and counts intervening faults. Introduces reuse distance (intervening page‑fault count) as a fingerprint, implements OPAM in Keystone, collects traces (100–200 inputs across 8 apps), trains a sequence CNN to classify applications with high accuracy, and demonstrates a reliable covert channel that encodes bits per page fault, proving InvisiPage/OPAM is not oblivious.
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:19Presentation Roadmap
- 0:44Enclaves Demystified
- 1:01Introducing ORAMS
- 2:18ORAM Meets Demand Paging and Enclav
- 4:19Our Contributions
- 5:11Introduction to Invisipage/OPAM Data Tree
- 8:56Vulnerability in OPAM (Invisipage) On every page fault or ORAM access exactly one page gets transferred.
- 10:16Example of Reuse Distance Attack
- 11:49Attack Methodology
- 14:36Secret Application Classification Accuracy (OPAM)
- 15:20Basic Idea
- 16:24Threat Model
- 16:51Example of an Encoding With Reuse Distan
- 18:37Bit Leakage Bandwidth Analysis
- 19:43Conclusions
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