Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Obfuscation and its Applications
summary
Defines public-coin differing-input obfuscation that forbids secret auxiliary info and shows existing impossibility attacks no longer apply, then bootstraps from a public-coin DIO for NC1 plus FHE and public-coin SNARKs to a succinct DIO for Turing machines. Builds a selectively secure succinct functional encryption for Turing machines using a three-key hashing trick (pk3 enables collision extraction), replaces universal arguments with obfuscated Turing machines for non‑blackbox simulation, and requires only polynomial (not sub‑exponential) assumptions.
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chapters (17)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:13Program Obfuscation
- 0:30Indistinguishability Obfuscation (10)
- 1:1410 is Difficult to Use
- 3:28Differing-Inputs Obfuscation (dio) [BGIRSVYOI]
- 4:07Auxiliary Input is Problematic • Recent negative Results
- 4:55Current Situation with dio
- 6:01How Auxiliary Input is Used
- 7:03Public-Coin dio
- 7:37Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Sampler
- 11:07Why Public-Coin Makes Sense • No secrets in aux. Existing implausibility results have
- 12:32What can we do with it?
- 16:27Functional Encryption
- 17:22Our Construction
- 22:06Proof Sketch
- 24:45Avoiding UARGs in Barak's Simulation
- 27:40Key Points • Must use obfuscation for Turing machines
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