The Social Cost of Strategic Classification
summary
Argues that raising classifier thresholds to optimize institutional accuracy via the Stackelberg equilibrium forces higher expected costs on truly qualified people by defining an individual burden and aggregating it into a social burden. Uses an outcome model with an outcome-monotonic cost assumption to reduce to threshold classifiers, proves institutional utility is quasi‑concave while social burden and a resulting social gap across subgroups are monotone increasing. Illustrates with Colombia welfare scores and FICO score manipulation.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Intro
- 2:04Means testing for social program eligibility
- 4:17What we normally focus on
- 6:29Improvement or gaming?
- 7:43A causal perspective
- 9:05Machine learning invites gaming
- 13:16A formal model
- 19:33Alternative measures of social cost
- 21:39Lemma: Reduction to threshold classifiers
- 26:56Measure of unequal burden
- 29:41How can differences in cost arise?
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