Proving capability safety in the presence of indirect sentries
summary
Extends a CHERI-style miniature machine (SeRiES) with indirect sentries, adapts an Iris-like program logic plus a new logical relation, and produces machine-checked proofs that capability safety still holds when entry capabilities load two worlds. Builds a heap-based calling convention that needs no trampoline code and proves robust local-state encapsulation: a sub-buffer example keeps the private half unchanged despite adversary access, showing the construction actually enforces the claimed guarantees.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Capability safety basics
- 2:35Indirect vs sealed pairs and sentries
- 4:22Indirect sentries mechanics
- 6:51Formal reasoning framework
- 9:17Unknown code execution logic
- 10:23Secure calling convention design
- 12:10Local state encapsulation
- 13:13Summary and future work
- 13:53Q&A
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