You Can Sign It, But Can You Trust It? Securing the Compilation Process
summary
Compiles are enclosed inside an Intel SGX enclave that runs a tiny WebAssembly runtime, redirects all syscalls to an in‑memory filesystem via a syscall‑mediation layer, and emits in‑toto attestation reports so every build step is recorded. Prototype runs tinycc inside the enclave, produces a native Linux binary, and shrinks the trusted computing base versus a regular OS stack (the presenter notes a typical build environment can include over 400 packages). Works today but prototype is SGX‑only.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:23Compilation security problems
- 1:48Notable compilation attacks
- 3:17Secure compilation limits
- 5:49Build environment challenges
- 7:19Reproducible builds limits
- 8:44Hermetic builds constraints
- 9:28Tricale framework
- 12:03Prototype design
- 13:31Tricale execution flow
- 17:08Q&A
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