Dirty Dancing - Untrustworthy SLSA Build Provenance
summary
Asserts that SLSA Level 3 provenance can be misleading, using slsa-github-generator plus GitHub Actions, sigstore/cosign, OCI.fyi and GitHub attestation to show a signed provenance whose commit ID matches but the built image contains different source because the workflow checks out a branch tag instead of the intended main commit. Demonstrates replacement by adding witness attestation that captures the checked-out commit at build time, then re-verifies successfully against the image digest and expected hello world output.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:03SLSA and threats
- 3:09Demo: SLSA provenance
- 5:25Verify in GitHub
- 9:03Dirty dancing exploit
- 12:39Flaws in default workflows
- 14:00Fixing provenance with Witness
- 16:51Enforce policies with Witness
- 18:38SLSA limitations
- 20:23SLSA future
- 21:06Q&A
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