Using the TPM NVRAM to Protect Secure Boot Keys in POWER9 OpenPOWER Systems
summary
Uses TPM 2.0 NVRAM to protect OpenPOWER secure boot keys by storing a SHA‑512 integrity value and a platform root indicator rather than all certificates, reducing space needs and limiting sensitive writes. Implementation creates three NV indices (2k per index limit), write‑locks them until next boot, and uses an update queue processed by the secure Linux kernel and OPAL with IBM’s DSS TSS; prototype works but currently offers no rollback protection.
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chapters (20)
- 0:00SECURITY
- 0:12Using the TPM NVRAM to Protect Secure Boot Keys in OpenPOWER
- 0:58Outline
- 1:20OpenPOWER Secure Boot Team
- 2:11Disclaimer
- 2:36What is Secure Boot for?
- 4:32POWER9 Boot Flow
- 8:13Firmware Secure Boot is Upstream
- 13:53Problem Statement
- 15:48Protecting the OS Secure Boot Keys
- 16:10OS Secure Boot Keys: Integrity
- 16:57TPM2 NV Authorization
- 20:28Atomic Secure Boot Variable Update
- 22:04OS Secure Boot NV Indices
- 25:26Firmware Secure Boot NV Index
- 26:16Other TPM2 NV Commands
- 27:53OS Secure Boot Architecture
- 29:27Final Considerations
- 31:29References
- 32:14Questions?
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