Securing TPM Secrets with TXT and Kernel Signatures
Talkat Linux Security Summit North America 2019 · on Monday, 2019-08-19· at 14:30· Sapphire D, Hilton San Diego Bayfront·
summary
Goal is to let only kernels signed by an authorized CA unwrap TPM2 NVRAM secrets by combining Intel TXT measured launch with signature-based PCRs instead of unstable hash PCRs. Work modifies tboot with PE/COFF verification and extends tboot policy to accept signing authorities; digest checks succeed in the prototype but on-target signature verification currently fails (user-space test harness works). Open issues: initramfs/command‑line signing, rollback/revocation handling, upstream acceptance and crypto licensing.
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Introduction
- 2:00The Problem
- 4:01Protecting TPM Secrets
- 5:02Secure Boot
- 6:17UEFI Secure Boot
- 8:53Intel TXT
- 12:15Lessons from TXT
- 14:29Proposed Solution
- 16:16Open Issues
- 18:12Current Status
- 20:33Questions
- 21:34Kernel rollback
- 22:37Authorities
- 25:41Notes
- 26:46Conclusion
- 28:28Question
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