CommSec D1 - The Life & Death of Kernel Object Abuse
summary
Survey of concrete exploit techniques against Win32k GDI: shows GDI Bitmaps (surf) and GDI Palettes abused to get relative/arbitrary kernel read/write, using pool spraying and deterministic allocations to overwrite PVScan0 or PFirstColor and then swap a process token to SYSTEM (demo drops a SYSTEM shell). Traces history (2015 bitmap work, 2017 palette disclosure) and presents the mitigation Type Isolation (RS4): per-type heaps, zero-on-free and slot bitmaps to prevent UAF → arbitrary R/W; mitigation is deployed and effective for covered types.
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chapters (23)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:47Attack Chain
- 1:47Memory Corruption - UAF - Use
- 2:02Memory Corruption - UAF - Exploitation
- 2:52Memory Corruption - x86 Integer Overflow
- 3:35Memory Corruption - Linear Overflow
- 4:43Memory Corruption - OOB Write
- 5:15Memory Corruption - OOB OF Exploitation
- 7:43Win32k Memory
- 8:38Statistics
- 13:58Abusing Bitmaps SURFOBJ - Exploitation
- 16:08Abusing Palettes PALETTE - Allocation
- 16:48Abusing Palettes PALETTE - Read Data
- 18:50Demo
- 22:24The Type Isolation Mitigation
- 25:59Not in Our Threat Model
- 27:21Type Isolation Doesn't Prevent UAFs
- 28:58Deny the Attacker Control of Memory
- 29:40Overlapping Different Types of Objects
- 31:10How Type Isolation Works
- 33:21UAF Scenario 2
- 36:06Similar Work
- 37:32Our Impact
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