~/talk

Paved Roads To Express RBAC In Threat Models

links:none on file
slides:none on file

Claims a small, reusable artifact called access maps that teams fill out (principals, entity type, situational flags, runtime dynamics) and bring into threat models. Demonstrates it on a concrete AWS flow — API Gateway → Lambda → Step Function with CloudWatch logging — and shows it surfaces unexpected risks like auditors able to run transaction execute, missing CSRF/secure-cookie checks, and need for MFA for high-value ops. Works as pre‑work to cut meeting time and produce assignable risks; one fifth of the room already rolled out threat modeling.

AI-written summary · about

  1. 0:00Threat modeling basics
  2. 1:05Misconceptions about threat modeling
  3. 4:21Threat modeling frameworks
  4. 8:02Threat modeling workflow
  5. 13:38Application architecture
  6. 16:10Sample transaction flow
  7. 20:01Access maps for RBAC
  8. 27:26Persona and role analysis
  9. 29:11Q&A: AI-driven threat modeling
  10. 31:42Q&A: Workshop details
  11. 34:33Q&A: Actionable properties
~/search
type to search 6,249 conferences, 138,987 speakers and 185,172 talks
~/help
cmdctrl k
search every conference, speaker and series
/
focus the filter search
h
home
c
conferences
s
speakers
e
series
t
light / dark — the status bar button does the same
?
this help
esc
close this, then clear every filter — or just the search, while you are typing in it

Ignored while you are typing. Pages without a filter rail have no search to focus.