Attacking Bluetooth LE Design and Implementation in Mobile + Wearables Ecosystems
summary
Shows concrete BLE implementation flaws in several popular wearables and consumer IoT devices and demonstrates data exfiltration from a fitness tracker using standard Android app development techniques. Uses an Ubertooth-One USB radio to capture and decode BLE traffic, reverse-engineers advertising and GATT characteristics, and links cleartext or weakly protected fields to user data (notifications, activity counts, timestamps). Concludes with practicable cryptographic fixes and BLE hardening steps that are simple to implement.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Introduction to talk
- 1:14Bluetooth LE in mobile systems
- 3:57Security challenges in Bluetooth
- 7:12Pairing vulnerabilities explained
- 10:18Mobile app and device risks
- 13:51Data privacy concerns
- 16:39Exploiting Bluetooth connections
- 19:18Communication between devices
- 21:03Application-level threats
- 22:21Data duplication risks
- 23:28Q&A and summary
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