Introduction to Zero Trust Security
summary
A concrete Zero Trust setup shows a CI host compromised by a plugin miner because inbound TCP was allowed but outbound was blocked, prompting a design that uses Boundary, Vault, and Consul plus Terraform on AWS/Kubernetes to enforce person, device, and service policies. Demos show SSH and DB access proxied through Boundary, dynamic DB creds from Vault, and mTLS via Consul, while gaps remain: no session recording, incomplete auditing, cert lifecycle not fully centralized, and TTLs break legacy apps.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Introduction to Zero Trust
- 2:25What is Zero Trust
- 8:09Challenges of Zero Trust
- 12:17Securing Person Access
- 20:21Demo Person Access Control
- 27:46Improving Person Access
- 29:33Securing Device Access
- 34:45Challenges of Device Access
- 38:59Securing Network Access
- 44:56Improving Network Access
- 47:03Conclusion and Q&A
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