Closing the Digital Backdoor Strengthening Vulnerability Management to Combat Spyware
summary
Unpatched flaws keep enabling Pegasus‑style intrusions; most exploit chains are common, unpatched bugs rather than exotic zero‑days, yet governments still stockpile vulnerabilities or buy tooling from vendors like NSO. WhatsApp litigation and recent fines show commercial accountability can work, while the Cyber Resilience Act and NIS2 aim to force better disclosure and patching for code and critical operators. Vulnerability equities processes disclose perhaps 90%+ of finds, but national security carve‑outs, ad hoc handling of smartphone zero‑days, and opaque oversight leave major gaps.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:25Panelist intros
- 6:04Vulnerability management roles
- 12:45Legal perspectives
- 19:55Pegasus inquiry findings
- 30:23EU vulnerability talks
- 42:33EU cybersecurity rules
- 52:43Strategic litigation
- 1:00:10Security oversight challenges
- 1:19:06Closing remarks
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