Privacy and Compliance - A pragmatic approach
summary
Claims that ZK proofs can’t handle rate limiting or interactive policies, and that making Tornado Cash compliant requires a proof of innocence which needs the user’s consent so it only works post-custody. Proposes combining operators or MPC for limits, keeping a temporary transaction log pruned after ~1 year with selective law‑enforcement access for transfers above about $1,000, and building anonymous everyday payments (true anonymity, not pseudonymity) as a working alternative to public ledgers.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Privacy and compliance intro
- 1:00Zero-knowledge limits in compliance
- 2:38Innocence proofs and rate limits
- 3:24Follow money with temp logs
- 5:10Preventing gov overreach
- 6:53Gov vs tech distrust
- 9:07Privacy vs legal needs
- 12:26Protecting minority rights
- 13:45Privacy advocacy
- 16:54Tech-neutral laws
- 19:11GDPR consent critique
- 20:24Summary and open discussion
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