Managing NymBoxes for Identity and Tracking Protection
summary
Nymix implements isolated per-pseudonym virtual machines (each nym pairs a browser VM with a separate communication VM) to prevent browser exploits, cross-session correlation, and confiscation leaks, and supports Tor, Dissent, or private transports. Persistent nims serialize to anonymous cloud storage while ephemeral nims erase state on shutdown. Prototype uses QEMU/KVM, overlayfs and KSM, costs about 600 MB per nymbox (config shows 500 MB browser + 150 MB con VM), boots a nym in ~15–25 s, and scales to eight nims with negligible additional Tor download latency.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Start
- 2:55Application Level Attack
- 4:14Correlation Attack
- 5:49Recap
- 6:27Nimix Architecture
- 8:22Overlay File System
- 10:26Data Sanitization
- 13:19Confiscation Attack
- 15:45Memory Usage
- 16:06Kernel Shared Memory
- 16:48Network Overheads
- 18:53Persistence Model
- 21:26Browser Fingerprinting
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