TPMs, Merkle Trees and TEEs: Enhancing SLSA with Hardware-Assisted...
summary
Proposes adding hardware-attested build-environment requirements to SLSA so CI platforms publish and validate VM image provenance using TPM PCR quoting plus an event log, verify large images at runtime with dm-verity/fs-verity Merkle trees (avoiding full 60 GB hashing), and bind a unique build execution ID into a TEE or confidential VM so the job ID is attestable before handing control; demonstrates feasibility on CI platforms like GitHub Actions and reports negligible runtime cost for Merkle verification.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00SLSA enhancements with hardware
- 1:23SLSA and build pipelines state
- 4:37Need for build platform hardening
- 9:52Trust but verify build environments
- 10:56Trusted Platform Modules and measured boot
- 14:09TPMs in CI/CD pipelines
- 17:59Boot chain and file system integrity
- 19:23File system integrity options
- 23:00Runtime build image validation
- 23:20Verifying build execution context
- 24:49Trusted Execution Environments primer
- 26:53Confidential Computing and VMs
- 29:29SLSA hardware enhancements proposal
- 31:35Key takeaways and call to action
- 33:32Q&A
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