MEV on eth2
summary
MEV persists after the merge because transaction ordering still uses the same client software and P2P layer, with validators selected in advance to propose beacon blocks; Flashbots data shows roughly 0.18 ETH per block of MEV and about 52% of blocks contain MEV, producing an estimated 70.9% validator revenue boost versus baseline. Known leader slots raises variance (unlucky vs lucky proposers ~15–39 blocks over time), creates pressure toward pooling and oligopoly, enables multi-block and contiguous-slot attacks, and motivates encrypted-to-validator bundles, secret-leader schemes, proof-of-custody and anti-correlated-slash incentives.
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chapters (28)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:15Recap
- 0:45Beacon Chain
- 1:50Standard Ethereum Transaction Execution
- 4:32Pintails Model
- 4:45Assumptions
- 5:31Validator Yields
- 6:24Rewards
- 6:37Proposal range
- 7:20Average MEV
- 7:50Variance of returns
- 8:36Uneven distribution
- 8:52Block validation
- 9:43Exchanges
- 11:11Metapools
- 12:17Identity
- 13:10New constraints
- 13:46Summary
- 15:04Questions
- 16:27Alternative architectures
- 18:42Is Ellie here
- 19:16Zoom chat
- 20:09Secret leader election
- 21:13Probability of two contiguous slots
- 21:27Research on contiguous slots
- 22:00Whats not clear
- 22:39Anticentralization measures
- 24:50Security attacks
