Defining the MEV Game on L2
summary
Claim that MEV cannot be eliminated but can be reduced by changing mempool rules, sequencer election, and transaction encryption, with concrete mitigations like MEV auction, randomized ordering, or a BFT sequencer on top of rollups. Notes that optimistic rollups risk sequencer/miner collusion during dispute periods yet chain-split is economically unlikely, that ZK rollups buy little unless used for secret leader election, and that application fixes (keeperDAO kCompound, bProtocol liquidator whitelists) concrete reduce liquidation MEV.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (8)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:30Welcome
- 0:53Questions to ask
- 4:40Layer 2s
- 7:52The optimistic rollup
- 8:44Complex interactions
- 10:34Crosschain MEV
- 11:38Questions
