The Human Nature of Failure and Resiliency
summary
Condenses 3,000 pages of research and a 200‑item bibliography into forty minutes, claiming humans are the primary cause of system failures and that latent errors plus uncontrollable enabling conditions produce cascades. Uses Deepwater Horizon as a concrete case—11 dead, 16 injured—to show latent errors + rare enabling condition. Recommends concrete practices: pre‑mortems, list and verify assumptions, build small controlled experiments with exit plans, remove punishment to create psychological safety so failures are reported and learned from.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Start
- 4:31Complexity
- 5:39Dislike variation
- 7:14Enabling conditions
- 13:12Often based on incorrect or invalid information
- 15:45Unquestioned assumptions become fact in the minds of the hearers
- 20:09Introducing Psychological Safety
- 24:42People become afraid to try new things: innovation stifled
- 25:24Normalisation of deviance
- 27:46Inability/reluctance to pull the plug (Sunk Cost Fallacy)
- 31:14Suggestion: Develop a culture of psychological safety
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