New Phone, Who Dis?: Human Authentication in the Digital Age
summary
Claims that NSW digital driver’s licence is more secure than plastic get tested with actual tools: the app is decompiled app and its QR payload is inspected (JWT‑like sections, encrypted blob, two UNIX timestamps). A replay/modify path and a QR token expiry bug let a locally‑modified app render a green tick; that hole is fixed quickly but shows the live system is spoofable without back‑end verification. Recommendation: require cryptographic verification and interoperability standard.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Introduction
- 2:45Identity Authentication Authorization
- 7:30Digital Drivers Licenses
- 15:25Digital Drivers License
- 18:18App
- 19:08License
- 20:13Data structure
- 22:08UNIX timestamps
- 22:39Fake QR codes
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