Standard Classification: Threat Modeling the CI/CD Pipeline to Improve Softwar...
summary
Shows that CI/CDs have a fractal attack surface illustrated by SolarWinds and Codecov incidents, explains failed netflow monitoring and a successful alternative to follow the code commit workflow, and supplies a reusable pipeline threat model with concrete checks: ask how each step authenticates to the next, locate the server performing each action, and trace where SCA or dynamic testing sends artifacts. Recommends a bastion proxy repository pattern for third‑party code, cautions about Maven/GitHub Actions plugins, and notes code signing and SBOMs don’t fix upstream compromises.
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chapters (22)
- 0:00Intro
- 2:22Notable Incidents
- 3:16Fundamental Disconnect . We have developed tremendous tooling and automation that allows us to create secure, reliable software at a scale not previously considered
- 5:13Threat Modeling Overview
- 5:45Confidentiality Impact
- 7:30Availability Impact
- 8:07Supporting Infrastructure
- 9:32The Perimeter is the Problem
- 12:54Example CI/CD Pipeline Dataflow
- 13:41Follow a Code Change
- 15:01General/Overarching Concerns
- 16:24Source Repository and Workflow Engine
- 18:48Open Source Component Management
- 19:24Open Source Backdoor Concerns
- 20:10Build Management
- 22:24Security Testing and Backdoors
- 23:30Software Packaging and Distribution
- 24:07Software Distribution
- 24:32Using the Threat Model
- 27:09Vendor Management
- 27:29Potential Argument Discussion Points
- 28:03Questions
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