Breaking RSA Authentication & Bitstream Recovery From Zynq-7000 SoC
summary
An implementation bug in the Zynq‑7000 FSBL causes the partition header to be read twice but authenticated only on the second read, letting an attacker feed a tampered header then a valid one to bypass RSA and execute arbitrary code. Exploit hardware is a simple SD‑card multiplexer switch that flips between tampered and genuine images within ~3 ms; combining this with a WBSTAR bitstream exfiltration over PCAP recovers encrypted bitstreams word‑by‑word (prototype pulls ~14 bytes/sec, ~3.85 MB in 46 days).
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction and overview
- 1:42Attack model and boot image
- 4:23Vulnerability mechanism
- 9:26Exploiting the vulnerability
- 13:04Proof of concept and findings
- 15:24Bitstream recovery technique
- 23:45Implementation challenges
- 28:52Practical demonstration
- 33:26Analysis of boot ROM
- 38:38Conclusion and Q&A
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