Quantification of MEV sharing design OFAs
summary
Quantifies MEV returnable to users by measuring searcher on-chain profits (Eigenphi indexes ~50–100k daily, median margin ≈3 bips, 95th few hundred bips, 99th ≈1k bips) and a conservative builder bid surplus (difference between top two builder bids ≈0.003 ETH per block ≈$5, median ≈$1), using Flashbots and MEV-Boost relay data. Finds proposer revenue rose from ~$600k/day to ~$1M/day; bid-surplus gives ~25k/day (~750k/month) and visible on-chain MEV upper bound ~1.4M/day (~42M/month). Off-chain/exchange MEV remains unknown.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:37Agenda
- 2:28Who takes what
- 3:15Defining all the value (past → present → future)
- 5:29Caveat: searchers' total revenue are unknown
- 6:09Searchers onchain profits - Total by MEV Type
- 6:45Builders' behavior pattern
- 8:24Proposer revenue over time
- 9:10(Accountable) MEV Split % Across Roles
- 10:13Look Again: The Funnel of MEV Market
- 12:301 Searcher onchain profits - EigenPhi Data
- 15:242 The Block Bidding "Surplus"
- 18:39Full picture
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