Securing Confidential VMs with COCONUT-SVSM
Talkat Linux Security Summit North America 2024 · on Thursday, 2024-04-18· at 09:55· Terrace Suite 1+2·
summary
COCONUT-SVSM is a Rust platform that moves hypervisor services into a trusted guest context to shrink Linux’s trust boundary: written in Rust, runs today on AMD SNP with prototype TDX 1.5 support, boots Linux guests from an IGM via QEMU, and already has a working TPM emulation (no persistence yet). Project sits on GitHub, targets multiple hypervisors, uses an in‑memory filesystem and cooperative user‑mode tasks, has 23 contributors, and focuses on isolating services in the highest VM privilege level to protect device state.
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chapters (20)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:24COCONUTSVSM history
- 3:13VM threat model
- 5:11Hardware extensions
- 6:21Memory management
- 9:29Interrupt injection
- 12:01Alternatives
- 14:01Memory Isolation
- 15:42COCONUTSVSM
- 17:00GitHub
- 17:36Multiple hypervisors
- 19:33Hardware support
- 20:14Services
- 22:28Project Status
- 23:04User Mode
- 24:31Persistence
- 26:07Pariser
- 27:09Enlighten vs Non Enlighten
- 32:35Interface
- 38:37Questions
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