What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism Design?
summary
Paper proves that adding cryptography — a practical MPC-assisted model where many miners run an honest-majority multi‑party computation over user bids — lets one implement a posted‑price style mechanism that is user‑incentive and miner‑incentive compatible and achieves 1‑SCP (coalitions of miner + one user cannot profitably deviate) with payments burnt. It constructs a diluted posted‑price protocol that is approximate 2‑SCP and attains optimal social welfare in large markets, but also proves an impossibility: no mechanism can resist miner collusion with two or more users even with MPC.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (9)
- 0:00Intro
- 6:02Naive Idea
- 7:45NPC Assistant Model
- 10:16Results
- 12:48One Observation
- 15:20MPC Assistant
- 17:09Why this is approximate
- 18:38More results
- 19:12Open questions
related talks
58mSecure Multiparty Computation I
01h 08mSecure Computation 1
40mApplied MPC
01h 03mClosing Keynote Day 2
30mOn the Optimal Round Complexity of Multi-Party Computation in the Plain Model
20mPrivate Bids, Public Proofs: A New Onchain Auction Design
40mCryptography in Distributed Systems
58mBlockchains and Publicly-Verifiable Lotteries