Near-Optimal Equilibria II

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" summary

Proves a smoothness inequality showing a single-item first-price auction achieves lambda=1/2 (improvable to ~0.63), uses a composition theorem so composition preserves smoothness for unit-demand bidders to get the same factor for simultaneous first-price auctions, and gives an extension theorem that translates those complete-information bounds into Bayes‑Nash guarantees only when baselines are private or when valuations are product (independent) priors (uses a sampling-of-types deviation). Delivers matching lower bounds via computational/communication-complexity reductions (subadditive case: factor 2).

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" chapters (12)

1. 0:00Intro
2. 0:47Extension Theorem Approach
3. 1:46Incomplete Information Games
4. 22:09Composition Theorem
5. 23:13Proof
6. 29:48Interpretation
7. 30:51Private and Public Baseline Strategies
8. 33:32Equilibrium Hypothesis
9. 38:12Summary
10. 42:47Example
11. 46:57Goal
12. 52:01Interpretations