WebAssembly Is All You Need:Exploiting Chrome and the V8 Sandbox 10+ times with WASM
summary
Claims that WebAssembly lets attackers turn parser bugs into full exploits and demonstrates 10+ Chrome/V8 sandbox escapes using concrete primitives and tools. Exploit chain includes a universal WASM type confusion from a missing type count check, a canonical index truncation bug (canonical type IDs truncated to 20 bits) that yields arbitrary JS-to-WASM downcasts and fake objects, an exception-signature confusion allowing cross-module type misuse, and a turbofan truncation that can cause a partitionalloc overwrite on Android. Uses wasm module builder, yields arbitrary in-cage read/write and successful sandbox escapes in CTFs and at least one real-world exploit.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction
- 2:09WebAssembly type systems
- 10:35Manfred Paul bug analysis
- 18:24Chrome bug via type index
- 24:43Type confusion in modules
- 27:54Memory access in TurboFan
- 33:31V8 sandbox design
- 36:00V8 sandbox bypasses
- 40:33WebAssembly security future
- 41:58Conclusions
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