Exploring Attacks in the Modular Rollup World
summary
Argues that modular rollups inherit censorship risk from every delegated component and shows concrete attacks: DA layers can withhold or reorder shared sequencer batches to delay finality, competing header producers can bribe DA proposers to win a highest-fee rule, ZK proof generation or propagation can be censored so onchain light clients block bridges and trigger liquidations, and the common seven day fraud proof window is arbitrary and unsafe when extra protocols sit between chains. Recommends threshold encryption and multiple proposers per block as practical mitigations.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Modular rollups and censorship
- 1:06Defining rollups and components
- 3:08Rollup architecture and delegation
- 4:12Attacks on sequencers and DA layers
- 6:01Execution attacks and reordering
- 7:30Header production and bribery
- 8:35ZK rollups and censorship
- 10:03Bridging risks and assumptions
- 11:46Fraud proof windows
- 12:51Attack vectors synthesis
- 13:32Mitigation strategies
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