Don't Trust, Attest: Enclaves as a Trust-Minimization Tool for Bitcoin Apps
summary
A concrete design that uses Nitro Enclaves and reproducible Nix builds to get verifiable PCR0 attestation, KMS-gated keys (GenerateDataKey/Decrypt) and SSM-stored ciphertext so secrets never appear in the host. Networking uses a TAP bridge with an untrusted proxy + enclave TLS terminator and attestation-embedded certs to prevent man-in-the-middle. Implementation powers an MPC cosigner wallet (two-party secret share) that successfully signs without storing user keys on-device and supports out‑of‑place and in‑place upgrade/rebind flows.
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chapters (19)
- 0:00Trust-minimized Bitcoin apps
- 1:08Cloud Bitcoin services problems
- 3:18Nitro enclave images
- 5:25Remote attestation and PCR
- 7:33Verifying enclave execution
- 8:16AWS enclave operations
- 10:06Threat model and adversaries
- 11:08Booting Nitro enclaves
- 11:50KMS policies for enclaves
- 13:59Secrets in enclaves
- 15:29Enclave file system
- 17:15Secure enclave networking
- 19:50TLS and attestation
- 20:52Secure enclave upgrades
- 23:01MPC wallet implementation
- 25:49Q&A: Cloud compatibility
- 29:06Q&A: PCR measurements
- 31:54Q&A: Bitcoin enclave framework
- 34:29Closing
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